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MENTAL DISEASE
AND THE
ECCLESIASTICAL COURTSt
RT. REV. MSGR. JOHN J. HAYES*

T

HE CONTENTS OF THIS PAPER seem to me somewhat elementary for

this audience, but I have been counseled by those much wiser than

I to the effect that a simple declaration of the proper procedure in
insanity cases and the attitude of the Rota as manifested over the years,
is most acceptable and valuable. Consequently, I am merely reaffirming
what is in the Code, in the Provida Mater, and in Rota decisions which
must be familiar to all of you, but which may yet be useful, because it
condenses into the space of half an hour, a great deal of legislation and a
number of judicial decisions about mental disease.
The task before the judge in a marriage case involving a plea for
declaration of nullity on the grounds of insanity of one of the parties
is a very difficult one. He is not asked to pronounce upon the sanity of
one who stands or sits or lies before him here and now; by the time
the case reaches him, it is abundantly evident that the person in question is not sui compos; if he were, the case would hardly be before the
court. Besides, cases in which one of the parties was openly and obviously insane at the time of the actual marriage are extremely rare, for
few people will marry a recognized lunatic, and even fewer priests or
civil or other authorities could be persuaded to officiate at such a
tThis article was originally published in 16 THE JURIST 267 (1956). It has been
slightly modified here with the author's permission. In connection with this article,
see the symposium on Mental Disease and Criminal Responsibility in 4 CATHOLIC
LAWYER (Autumn 1958) and 5 CATHOLIC LAWYER (Winter 1959).

*Officialis, Diocese of Bridgeport.
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marriage. No, the courts must normally
deal with the determination of the ability of
a person to have given matrimonial consent at the time of entering the contract of
marriage, which is anywhere from months
to years in the past, and in a case where
the signs were not so obvious at the time
as to make the partner or official witness
refuse to go on. It is good that a corpus of
law, precedent and presumption, has been
built up for the judge's guidance, and it is
a pleasure for me to trace the consistency,
the wisdom, the clarity, the essential saneness and even shrewdness of Church legislators and especially courts in this important matter.
I have called this an important matter,
and indeed it is. Anything is important
which deals with the progressive deterioration of the human intellect and personality,
and our responsibility in the premises is
grave indeed. Besides, the mere incidence
of these cases is already on the increase;
one of the first things that impressed me as
I thumbed through the Rota cases in a preliminary survey for this paper was the sheer
numerical increase of insanity cases proportionately to others. Obviously, the enormous increase in mental disease in our time
already makes its mark upon our courts;
the promise is that this tendency will continue, unless some new drug or technique
of treatment be discovered.
In the face of this vast and continuous
increase in the number of those afflicted
with mental disease, it is good to know that
the Rota (and other courts following it)
has been moving steadily and consistently
towards a jurisprudence in the field of mental disease which gives substantial guidance
to any local ecclesiastical judge in marriage cases. The de iure portion of one decision after another presents a series of

considerations which, taken with the line
of decisions, forms a body of precedent
which it would be difficult to assail.
Incidentally, it is quite significant that we
find the Rota and other ecclesiastical courts
dealing so largely with cases of mental disease so soon after the development of
modern psychiatry. It is a common charge
against all courts, civil and ecclesiastical,
that they run a generation or two behind
the time, that they are so rigidly determined to abide by the principle stare
decisis that they are relatively blind to
newly discovered facts, and theories, and
circumstances which might justly challenge
precedent. Thus, in our own country, and
in recent time, Mr. Roosevelt attempted to
defend his desire to pack the Supreme
Court with judges of his own choosing (and
his philosophy) by presidential jibes at the
"nine old men" and with the charge that
the court was still living in "horse and
buggy days." Regardless of the merits of
this particular case, we know it is common
for people in litigation to criticize courts as
cold-hearted, unfeeling, unsympathetic, too
much absorbed in past principles and precedents to see present realities and see them
whole.
It is good, therefore, that in this agonizing matter of mental disease, the Rota (and
following the Rota, other courts) has been
modern in its knowledge of the field. For
this matter of mental disease is truly especially agonizing in our time. Dr. Braceland 1
remarks that if any other disease were on
the increase at the same rate as mental
disease, a state of national emergency would
be declared. There are more people in mental hospitals than there are students in all
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our colleges and universities. Mental disease is a pressing problem.
Another sidelight of interest here is that
the attitude of ecclesiastical courts toward
the psychiatric profession will undoubtedly
have historical value in defense of the
Church. In our day, there is a widespread
misconception that thierie is a basic conflict between psychiatry and Catholicism. It
is difficult to understand why. The Church
has made its position in the matter abundantly clear. Pope Pius XII had spoken on
the subject to various audiences, and each
time had expressed his opposition to the
extreme atheistic and materialistic determinists in the psychiatric profession, while
insisting upon the fact that there is no conflict between sound psychiatry and true religion. Similarly, the ecclesiastical courts
rely upon the testimony of psychiatrists,
recognize their interpretations of symptoms
and, in general, treat psychiatrists with a
respect which reflects a conviction of the
entirely acceptable standing of the profession. Beyond this, it is a common practice
among the clergy to refer emotionally and
mentally disturbed persons to individual
psychiatrists. Psychiatric hospitals and psychiatric wards are under Church direction.
Priests practice the psychiatric profession.
It is an outstanding example of the persistence of error, that against such a background the idea can exist that there is a
fundamental conflict between Catholicism
and psychiatry. Why does the false idea
live on? We do not know. Perhaps it is
because the atheistic, pansexualist wing of
the profession is so voluble and vociferous.
Perhaps in answering their absurdities we
have not always been careful to make clear
the fact that in fighting them we are not
indicting all psychiatry.
In May 1955 an article appeared in the
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Woman's Home Companion on the subject, "What Does Your Church Think of
Psychiatry?" In the course of this article
reference was made to the fact that people
wishing information about Catholicism and
psychiatry should write to the Guild of
Catholic Psychiatrists, Stamford, Connecticut. I mention this because of the fact that
in the following two months I received
1431 letters and post cards seeking information about psychiatry and religion; and
812 of these correspondents expressed
varying degrees of surprise that Catholics
could have anything to do with psychiatry!
Sooner or later this misconception will be
eradicated, but we may rest assured that
there will be those who will continue to
insist for years to come, that the Church in
the beginning opposed psychiatry. Meanwhile, the Rota and our other courts are
building up proof to the contrary. This
will be a valuable polemical weapon for
us through the years.
The Rota uses the words "amentia" and
"dementia" in discussing mental illness. It
should be noted that these words as used
by the Rota have no particular relationship
to the meaning of these terms on the lips
of a modern psychiatrist. The Rota by
"dementia" seems to mean monomania, or
fixed ideas, and if these fixed ideas be outside the area of the marriage contract, valid
consent would be possible. "Amentia" quite
clearly indicates to us a state of true insan-ity causing an inability for responsible action or true consent. We may well thank
God that the Rota has used these words so
consistently; one can understand the nature
of the illness in question in any particular
case by reading the description of the illness, its symptoms and developments, in
the court records. Had the Rota adopted
the rich and confusing terminology of a
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growing and eager psychiatric profession,
we might have been driven to despair. To
know what I mean, I advise any one of you
to take up a book on modern psychiatry,
let us say Odenwald & Van Der Veldt, or
Cavanagh & McGoldrick, and see there, the
hundreds of divisions and subdivisions of
mental disease. We know what the Rota
means and that, in this our day, is a gain
indeed. Generally speaking, the Rota supports the nullity of marriage in cases of
proved amentia. In general terms again, it
normally holds for the validity of the marriage in cases of dementia.
Insanity cases are admissible in our
courts only because the "consent of the
parties" makes marriage and without it a
marriage is impossible 2 In the Canon Law
we have no "statutory" impediments to the
marriage of the mentally ill. If one is truly
insane, matrimonial consent is closed to
him 3 by the law of nature. Nor is there a
question of error or fraud; whether the
other party knows about the insanity at the
time is irrelevant.
What degree of discretion must a man or
woman have to give such consent as is
required? This question has been long and
much debated, and a definitive apodictic
fixed rule can hardly be set. Consequently,
the nub of many a marriage case is precisely here. Has the mental disease at the
time of the marriage reached such a point
that consent is now impossible? Certainly,
greater discretion is necessary than that required to commit a mortal sin. And certainly, one of the great questions in the field
of legal medicine is that of the responsibility of the psychotic person for his acts,
with opinion more and more inclined to
2

deny such responsibility. Of course the
materialistic determinists are forced on a
priori grounds to deny all true responsibility for anybody about anything; but
there are those among psychiatrists of
sound background and good philosophy
who, nevertheless, deny true responsibility
in persons afflicted with certain types of
mental illness. The insight required for
marriage being greater than for mortal sin,
an a fortiori argument against the validity
of marriage in such cases is admissible. Thc
Rota is on record very clearly on the subject of how much discretion is required for
matrimonial consent, and its attitude is
sane and shrewd and sound. In a Rota
case 4 the judge was asked to sit on a matter which involved a person who, it was
claimed, was incapable of appreciating the
"ethical side" of marriage, although rational in other respects. This man's relationship with women for many, many years
had been of an exclusively trifling nature.
It was argued that because over so long a
period he had had one affair after another
with several women, he was psychologically
incapable of comprehending the concept of
a union with a woman which would be
sacred and exclusive and permanent. In
other words, he was unable to give true
consent to marriage.
In this case, the psychiatric expert retained'by the Rota itself held that Tito, the
husband, although intelligent (he was a
lawyer, but with a history of narcotic addiction), was incapable of valid matrimonial consent. "Given his constitutional
immorality," said the expert, "he could not
evaluate sufficiently the ethical side of the
marriage act, much less the importance of

Coram Julien omnibus videntibus, 5 July 1947;

39 S.R. Rota Dec. 397 (1947).
3 Ibid.

4 Causa nullitatis matrimonii coran Wynen, Feb.

24, 1941.
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the duties that derive from this act. He
understood the act that he performed, but
he did not freely determine himself to it.
Consequently, Signor Tito should be held
irresponsible both from the moral and the
juridical viewpoint." 5
There was much more expert testimony
to the same effect, but in the end, the court
refused to declare the marriage null. The
factual evidence of mental incapacity at the
time of the marriage itself and for the three
years preceding it and the three years following it, was very weak. The significant
thing to my mind is the fact that the learned
and influential judge, Monsignor Arthur
Wynen, thought it necessary to examine at
great length the psychological and psychiatric grounds alleged, and furthermore, that
he admitted as a matter of principle and as
not inconsistent with scholastic philosophy
and theology, that it is not enough for freedom and imputability that there be a mere
conceptual cognition; there is required in
addition, the ability to weigh and evaluate
the substantial elements of the proposed
action. The following are excerpts from his
opinion: 6
In not a few judgments there is really
a twofold cognitive function which can be
and should be distinguished; the one merely
representative or conceptual, the other,
deliberative or evaluative; and this twofold
function is principally in evidence in judgments which concern "practicable things"
("agibilia"), in other words in practical
judgments. The merely conceptual cognition expresses what the object of cognition

is, the evaluative cognition expresses what
importance or worth it has, or what value
it has. Generally, a man perceives both
aspects together-in the same act of cogni6 ld. at 149-51.
5 33 S.R. Rota Dec. 15; Nullitas Matrimonii
coram Wynen Feb. 25, 19 4 1, p. 144 at 148 (1950).
(1950).
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tion; especially an adult in those matters
which pertain to ordinary, everyday experience. But neither factually nor conceptually, do these two cognitions express the
same thing; they express rather diverse
aspects of the same object. Experience
shows that the merely conceptual judgment
is formed earlier and with much more difficulty. Furthermore, it is to be noted that
the use of reason which is required for
every human act, regards both conceptual
cognition and evaluative cognition, and
demands a capacity both for the exercise
of reason, and for the dominion of reason,
that is, the capacity of a man to dispose of
himself and of his action according to that
twofold cognition of the object....
Now it is one thing for a man to lack the
requisite evaluative cognition, and another
for him to pay no attention to it. A child

of five years who sets fire to his father's
hayloft, although h'ehas conceptual cognition both of the hayloft and the fire, does
not have evaluative cognition of the crime,
that is the objectively very serious violation

of right order which he perpetrates; and
consequently, this violation cannot be imputed to him. He does have, however, both
conceptual and evaluative cognition of.his
act inasmuch as it is a wrongful childish

deed, and accordingly, in this respect, his
action is imputed to him and is deserving
of punishment. But an adult who posits the
same external act, generally has not only
conceptual cognition, but also evaluative
cognition of the crime he commits, but he
pays no attention to it; because notwithstanding it, he proceeds to the commission
of the crime, and therefore, he should be
fully accountable for it. And this essential
difference between child and adult as regards the imputability of their own acts,
obtains even more in civil law and especially in the law of contracts than it does
in criminal law. A child of five years, who
spends a thousand lire on sports and childish amusements, although he may perhaps
understand very well conceptually what a
thousand lire are, and what sports and
amusements are, and what buying and selling are, nevertheless, because he lacks the
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necessary mental development and maturity, is not yet able to evaluate and
weigh, not even as to substantials, what it
is to spend a thousand lire on sports and
amusements. Therefore, even from the
viewpoint of natural law alone, he must be
said to contract invalidly.
Whenever a man, who because of his age
is presumed to be endowed with power of
sufficiently evaluating something, is said
nevertheless, to have acted without sufficient evaluative cognition, that can arise
either from the fact that he did not want,
or from the fact that he was unable, to
evaluate or weigh the proposed action
sufficiently. One who does not want to
acquire this knowledge will generally not
escape either the subjective imputability or
the objective obligatory force of his act,
since he affects ignorance, and it is hardly
ever possible to discern whether sufficient
evaluative cognition was lacking - at least
of a confused and implicit kind. But one
who is unable to evaluate at least the substance of the proposed action, is obstructed
in his natural power of appreciation, either
by an impediment which is merely temporary and transitory (drunkenness, delirium, violent fever, etc.) or by an habitual
defect (whether congenital or acquired
during the course of his life); this type of
habitual defect is present in not a few
mental diseases and psychic anomalies,
among which in recent times has been numbered so-called constitutional immorality.
This case has now been made the subject of a juridical monograph by an Ital7
ian Jesuit, Father G. M. Fazzari, S.J. I
have not been able to read this essay, but
frc-n various reviews of it, gather the followirt: after examining matrimonial consent from all sides, including its affective
elements, the author concludes that "constitutional immorality" can amount to a
psychic incapacity to give valid consent.
7 D'AURIA,
,noniale

Valutazione etica e consenso inatri(ETHICAL

MONIAL CONSENT)

EVALUATION

(Summer 1956).
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"The use of reason, which is required in
order not to be ignorant [of the substantials of marriage within the meaning of
Canon 1082] is not sufficient for the capacity to give a valid consent," according
to this author. There is required in addition,
"a maturity and normalcy of psychic links
[collegamentil which permit the spontaneous transformation of the knowledge of
marriage into a rational appreciation, at
least confused and implicit, of all its essen'8
tial aspects, particularly the ethical."
It seems to me very significant that a
judge of the standing of Monsignor Wynen
would concede the possibility of deciding
a case on the grounds of lack of evaluative
consent, and the essay of Father Fazzari is
further evidence that modern psychological
findings are making some impression. But
I think it will be some time before marriages will be successfully attacked on these
grounds. After all, the ecclesiastical courts
demand moral certainty that a given consent was invalid by reason of mental incapacity. Constitutional immorality is one
of the more obscure chapters in psychiatric
literature as is also the mental illness of the
so-called psychopath personality. If the
courts hesitate to accept the concurring
opinions of -many experts, as they did in
the case just described, it is clear that there
would be little hope of an annulment in a
case where the experts disagreed. Psychiatric experts will be very likely to disagree
as to the moral and legal responsibility of
psychopaths.9
8 Fazzari's book is reviewed by Rebecchi in 56
Divus Thomas 155 (1953); another review appears in 27 Estridios Ecclesiasticos, (1953).
')CLECKLEY, THE MASK OF SANITY

(1950),

where

psychopaths are considered to be psychotics and
largely irresponsible for their erratic behaviour.
In
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PSYCHIATRY (1953), it is said: "In the present
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But whether in ecclesiastical or civil or
criminal proceedings of any kind, the thing
that prevents courts from accepting psychiatric findings seems to me to be the
inability of the experts to agree among
themselves. I have heard court officials
complain that psychiatry is not scientific
because you can always get good, reputable
experts on both sides, whose testimony is
diametrically opposed on the question of
responsibility. I think the judges in ecclesiastical courts are inclined to say to the psychiatrists: "First come to agreement among
yourselves as to the findings of your science, and then we will listen to you." And
they have the further reservation as to psychiatric testimony on responsibility: "If
you are a psychiatrist who does not believe
in free will anyway, we cannot help being
suspicious when you testify that someone is
not responsible for something. Your denial
of free will should logically, in our opinion,
lead you to deny that anyone is ever responsible for anything." 10
Again, the Rota has rejected the opinions
of the experts with its reasons founded in
the testimony of the inexperti, the relatives,
the friends, the pastor of the party. Thus,"'
there is a record of a woman who was accused that because she used drugs excessively, she was constantly and habitually
deprived of the use of reason for a long
time before her marriage, and therefore, incapable of consent to the marriage contract.
Three experts were called to testify as such,
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two periti and subsequently, a peritior.1
The two periti testified clearly that because
of her addiction, the lady could not have
sufficient power of mind and will for valid
matrimonial consent. The peritior leaned
in that direction without being quite so
definite, but even some of his opinions and
conclusions were rejected by the court.
This, on the basis that the pastor, relatives
and friends believed her to enjoy sufficient
powers of mind to enter upon a valid contract. They testified that she had freely and
voluntarily given consent, that she truly
loved her husband, and she desired the
marriage. In giving a finding non constare
de nullitate, the Rota comments:

We say the peritior erred because he
demands too much for valid contracting;
not merely the use of reason, but sound
critical acumen, prudence, wisdom, good
judgment, etc. Also, he asks more of the
will than is necessary. Granted, for the sake
of argument, that the lady, without an
injection of morphine, would not have
given consent, this does not make her consent invalid. For it matters not how she is
led to consent, whether altogether from
within or also from some external incitement; it is required and suffices for valid
contracting that the contracting party places
a positive act of the will and legitimately
manifests it. Nor has it been demonstrated
that the lady was incapable of placing such
an act; the contrary is evident. For, overcoming the opposition of her family and
her own subjective uncertainty, she actually decided to get married, prepared
everything necessary to this purpose, she
went to church and there gave her consent.

state of our knowledge and public opinion, we

have little choice but to state, when asked for an

12 The periti are experts who scientifically evalu-

opinion, that the psychopathic personality is
legally responsible for his acts. Certainly he
knows the difference between right and wrong,
on an intellectual level at least, even if he does
not accept it emotionally."
10See 33 S.R. Rota Dec. 15, at 166-67 (1941).
1129 S.R. Rota Dec. 195 (1937).

ate the significance of the behaviour of the person whose sanity is in issue. They have observed
the patient or they have seen the testimony of
lay witnesses (inexperti). Cf., Can. 1792. The
peritior is called to evaluate the opinions of the
periti, usually because there is disagreement. Cf.,

Can. 1801, § 3; Can. 1803.
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How the specialist judges from her antecedent uncertainty that her consent is
invalid, we do not know. These, then, are
the reasons on account of which the judges
reject the testimony of the specialist in
favor of the nullity.
In these two cases, both of which I think
interesting, the first, because of the recognition of some of the obscurer claims of
modern psychology; the second, for its sanity and good sense in the presence of the
somewhat precious reasoning of the experts, the Rota has stood for validity. But
the traditions of the Rota in terms of true
insanity are quite different. Let us look at
the provisions regarding: (1) presumptions, (2) lucid intervals, (3) experts. The
attitude of the Rota is so fixed that a marriage case entered on the ground of insanity stands or falls on the facts. The law is
established. The precedents are clear and
numerous; the presumptions are established
in law. In all marriage cases:
1. The prevailing basic presumption is
"in dubio standum est pro valore matrimonii."
2. Also, there is a prevailing presumption
in natural law .that all men are sane, until
the contrary is proved.
3. Then, there is a vastly important presumption regarding the lucid interval. When
a person is known to have been insane before and after, there is an established presumption that he remained insane and
incapable of consent during the interval.
The period of intermission is presumed to
be a lessening of the insanity rather than a
cure because mental ailments are of their
nature enduring.

'

demonstrable today since modern medical
opinion tends to view the lucid interval as
a mere screening of latent insanity. Civil
codes usually deny recognition to contracts
entered during such intervals. 14 Insanity is
of an essentially degenerative nature. Having proved amentia antecedent and subsequent to marriage, concomitant amentia is
rightly deduced, which is always true in
those diseases which are rooted in congenital bases like "dementia praecox, sive
hebefrenica sive paranoica." 1'
Lucid intervals mean a termination or
even a temporary cessation of the signs of
insanity, which does not mean that the
patient is cured, but only that the underlying malady is obscured. 16 These presumptions, of course, as all presumptions in
marriage cases, or in anything else for that
matter, yield always to the facts. Indeed,
the presumption requires the support of
circumstances and evidence sufficient to
raise it to the level of moral certitude in the
judge, which is demanded for any judicial
sentence. I do not suppose any judge would
demand evidence of actual anterior delusions or hallucinations; but we certainly
need evidence of some kind to indicate that
mental disease was already underway, such
as excessively moody behavior, strange actions and statements, bizarre behavior (fixing people with stares, secret and furtive
chucklings, etc.), any combination or all of
which have weight as showing that the progressive deterioration has already begun.
This lucid interval doctrine is now pretty
well established. Occasionally, Defensores
Vinculi in lower courts will zealously argue

This is all the more
14

26 S.R. Rota Dec. 83 (1934); 25 S.R. Rota
Dec. 47 (1933); 10 S.R. Rota Dec. 18 (1919); 8
S.R. Rota Dec. 19 (1916); 1 S.R. Rota Dec. 10,
17, 21 (1909).
1

2
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157 S.R. Rota Dec.20 (1915).
16 13 S.R. Rota Dec. 5 (1921).
RIAGE CASES

n. 785 (1932);
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5
against this lucid interval presumption (i.e.,
the presumption that there is no lucid interval) but they get nowhere and should
get nowhere.
4. Another interesting and highly significant dondition of insanity case hearings is
that the Code (Can. 1982) orders that the
opinion of experts is to be sought. This is
mandatory in- Canon Law, not optional.
This is something new in the Code. The
Rota as late as 1916 declared a marriage
involving insanity null without having called
upon any experts, and the judges wrote
into their decision the fact that no law required the calling of experts. 17 Even now,
the law demands the experts' testimony
only as a matter of liceity in the court proceedings. A judge who reaches a state of
moral certitude without them would seem
to pronounce sentence validly. The Rota
speaks to the point here also: "An expert
must be called if it be necessary to detect
the existence and nature of the insanity; but
it there be present common signs by which
any person of sense could know, especially
when these signs are numerous and long18
lasting, no expert need be called."
The expert is called to determine two
things: (1) Was the party sane? (2) Was
his mental disease such that real consent to
the contract of marriage was impossible?
There is no limit on the number of experts
either way. The Code, using the plural,
would suggest at least two; Provida Mater
says one is enough in simple cases; the
Rota' 9 once used ten. Whoever they are,
they should be eminent and competent, not
necessarily Catholic, but "imbued with the
Catholic doctrine on insanity."'20 And I may
17 8 S.R. Rota Dec. 19 (1916).
18 15 S.R. Rota Dec. 15 (1923).
" 10 S.R. Rota Dec. 1 (1918).
20 Provida Mater art. 151.
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add, that we ought to be sure they know
what we are after, i.e., the two questions
with which I opened this paragraph: Was
he sane? Could he consent?
Mental disease has many wide and unpredictable ramifications. Various psychiatrists may hold widely differing opinions on
the nature or origin or course of the same
disease. They may disagree violently upon
many matters with which the disease is
concerned. But much of this disagreement
may from our point of view be simply irrelevant. Our concern is with the one simple question: "Was the person capable of
giving consent"? Doctors who might agree
on this one point affirmatively or negatively
might differ on everything else, yet we
would have the consensus we ideally seek
from the experts.
Both Canon Law and Provida Mater are
anxious that the judges receive as complete
a picture as possible of the illness which
allegedly vitiates the consent. Therefore,
the doctors who had treated the defendant
before the case came up in court are barred
as experts, because they may already have
formed their opinions; it is required that
they be summoned as Witnesses (Can.
1982; ProvidaMater, art. 143). Aside from
thus providing a full picture, such witnesses
can provide evidence for the experts in
such times as the expert cannot examine
the party because of absence or refusal to
undergo an examination. The Code (Can.
1982) directs an examination, with an eloquently shrugged "si casus ferat."
Experts are chosen by the judge. We do
not have the spectacle in ecclesiaftical
courts of psychiatrists testifying to contradictions because they are "for the defense"
or "for the plaintiff." After the testimony of
the experts has been received, the judge is
free, in good conscience of course, to re-
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ject their testimony, to call other experts or
one other of greater skill to look further
into the matter. Nor at long last is he in
anyway bound to follow the expert opinion,
nor the opinion of the "more expert."'"
They are skilled in their field, but he is the
judge. This is true even if they all concur,
though one wonders about the quality of
the judgment that would go against the
unanimous concurring testimony of specially qualified experts in the field of their
specialty. But of course there are many
other elements in the proof of a case which
might give the judge reason for going
against the experts, and the judge must of
course concern himself with all possible
elements of proof which are available.
Other witnesses should always be called to
testify to the daily life of the person before
and after the marriage, his mode and content in conversation, his attitudes, his insight, his mannerisms, his obsessions, his
judgment of events, local, personal and
public, his appreciation of his surroundings,
his family relations, etc. 22 In spite of these
other sources of proof, the Code (Can.
1804, § 2) demands that a judge rejecting
the opinion of experts must state the reasons upon which the rejection is based. This
interestingly reverses the principle established by the Rota's 23 saying it was not necessary to state the reasons for rejection.
Thus, while ordinarily he would and should
accept the judgment of experts of whose
24
competence and honesty he is satisfied,
the judge remains the final voice in the
solemn decision about the validity of the
marriage contract which is, after all, a sacrament. "Nam periti non sunt conjudices
21
22
23
24

20 S.R. Rota Dec. 6
8 S.R. Rota Dec. 19
3 S.R. Rota Dec. 39
1 S.R. Rota Dec. 10

(1928).
(1916).
(1911).
(1909).

sed consiliarii tantum, nec eorum voto
quantum vis erudito et concordi alligatur
25
judex."
Thus, the judge is firmly protected
against purely diagnostic medical decisions.
It is good that he is; psychiatric theory is
prolific and eloquent, but when it comes to
individuals the theory, like statistics, breaks
down. Each case must be judged separately
on its own merits. There is a medical
theory, put forward to me recently by an
able and generally conservative psychiatrist, that if a man actually develops openly,
at the age of say 40, a certain constellation
of symptoms, we can safely conclude that
whether he gave evidence of it or not, he
was already a victim of mental disease, already constitutionally incapable of sound
judgment or valid consent to contract when
he was 7 or 12 or 15 or 20, or any time up
to the present. To this thesis Dr. Francis
Braceland writes:
Frequently in marital situations, the
question is asked whether this man knew
what he was doing, and the psychiatrist is
put on the spot. The answer is that he may
have known what he was doing, and yet,
have his judgment colored by delusions.
For instance, there are many people who
are teetering along outside of hospitals.
They are borne up by the security of their
families, the fact that people put up with
their idiosyncrasies, that the people in their
jobs understand them, and they live narrow, constricted lives in which very few
demands are made upon them. Then comes
some type of stress, whether it is being
taken into military service, an accident, a
serious illness, or perhaps the feeling that
he should be married. Many times this
feeling that he should be married is simply
because of what other people will think
and someone gets picked out as the partner.
If the individual is paranoid, if the indi25
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vidual is schizophrenic, or homosexual, this
marriage will tip over the patient, not
invariably, but nearly so, and as a consequence, there will be a psychotic break,
and often a frank, open schizophrenia.
Now that patient was schizophrenic to
begin with, but he was compensated, as
we say, just like a heart is compensated
and it is only under great stress, such as
adjusting to another person, the sexual
problems involved, etc., that he breaks.
Mind you, he might have broken later anyhow, but this simply does it quickly. The
job for the psychiatrist, therefore, is to
determine the diagnosis. If the diagnosis is
schizophrenia, this is not something which
happens all at once; this is a way of life, as
it were; it has been coming on for a long
26
time.
In this description, the actual marriage
can be precisely the precipitating factor
which brings out his insanity - not that he
now becomes mentally ill and incapable of
consent but that he always was and now we
know it. Similarly, Monsignor Fidecicchi
says:
It happens frequently that the family
and friends of the sick person do not notice
the confusion of his mind, especially at
the beginning of the insanity. Whence it
follows that it is not unusual for a person
to seem capable of carrying on his ordinary
duties well - and yet he must be considered unfit for marriage - sometimes the
26 Private letter to me dated September 22, 1955.
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violently insane remaih in a state of apparent quiet and yet their actions are not those
of their own mind.
In summary, then, the whole subject of
mental disease in connection with the ecclesiastical courts is one which will require
increasing attention as the diseases themselves tend to become increasingly prevalent. In these circumstances it is a consolation and a comfort to know that the jurisprudence of the Rota is quite clear on what
we should do in the judging of such cases.
There are certain mental diseases which of
their nature allow a lucid interval in which
marriage might be contracted validly. But
there are other diseases in which it is no
longer in accordance with precedent to assume a lucid interval. If it can be demonstrated that the person had been afflicted
with this disease prior to and after the time
in which the marriage was contracted, the
established presumption is against the existence of any lucid interval.
Besides the establishment of presumptions with regard to the existence of a
lucid interval, Canon Law and court practice have quite clearly outlined the place
of the expert in cases of mental disease. He
is to be consulted, his opinions are to be
carefully pondered, but the judge, in the
final analysis, has full responsibility for the
decision.

